Seminal political economy models from Meltzer and Richard, among others, theorize that, in a democracy, more inequality leads to more redistribution. Unfortunately, most country-level empirical studies find weak support for this prediction. The analysis improves upon previous tests by combining four elements: (1) it employs redistribution -measured as the difference between pre-and post-redistribution inequality as its dependent variable; (2) it uses an indicator of inequality before tax and transfers as its independent variable; (3) it accounts for country-specific unobserved factors; and (4) contrary to most tests that are restricted to advanced industrial democracies, it covers 91 developed and developing democracies worldwide. The study finds that, as expected by political economy models, inequality is associated with more redistribution.
pirical evidence in favor of the RRMR model is weak. Most studies using countrylevel data find either that there is no relationship between inequality and redistribution, or even that inequality is actually associated with less redistribution. 7 The weakness of these findings has prompted some scholars to assert the existence of a "paradox of redistribution" or a "Robin Hood paradox. My empirical analysis improves upon previous ones by combining four elements. First, unlike many previous tests, I use redistribution rather than social and welfare spending as my dependent variable. This is an important improvement because social and welfare spending does not necessarily redistribute from the rich to the poor, which is what the RRMR model is meant to capture. 10 Instead, I employ the indicators of redistribution of Solt, which capture the change between 7 For example, Wallerstein 2001, 2003; Perotti 1996. 8 For example, Georgiadis and Manning 2012; Iversen and Soskice 2009; Lindert 2004 . It must be noted that these paradoxes do not only pertain to redistribution but to pro-poor policies more generally.
9 Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Boix 2003 . See, for example, Samuels 2010, 2014; Kaufman 2009; Knutsen forthcoming; Slater, Smith and Nair 2014. 10 Le Grand 1982; Milanovic 2000; Segura-Ubiergo 2007. the market (pre-tax and transfers) and net (post-tax and transfers) inequality levels of a country during a given year. 11 In other words, they indicate the extent to which tax and transfers have reduced (or increased) inequality during that year.
Second, I use an indicator of inequality before tax and transfers (market inequality) as my independent variable. Many previous studies have instead employed measures that capture inequality after redistribution has already taken place (net inequality). Third, contrary to most other authors, I account for country-specific unobserved factors by including country fixed effects. Country-specific factors could, for example explain both why some countries had low levels of redistribution in the past -and thus high levels of inequality today -and low levels of redistribution today; potentially creating a spurious negative relationship between inequality and redistribution. Although I find that inequality increases redistribution even when country fixed effects are omitted, I do find that the magnitude of the relationship increases when they are included.
Fourth, while most previous tests are restricted to a small number of rich democracies, this paper covers 91 developed and developing democracies worldwide. To my knowledge, this is the first study to test the effect of market inequality on redistribution (rather than social and welfare spending) outside a small number of (mostly) advanced industrial democracies. 12 It is also the first paper to find support for the RRMR model among a wide sample of developing countries. This point is particularly important given that many of the applications of the RRMR model -for example, regarding the effect of inequality on regime transitions -are most relevant to developing countries.
11 Solt 2009 Solt , 2014 12 Some studies do cover a few middle income democracies, such as Brazil, however (e.g., Scervini 2012 ).
Inequality and Redistribution Theoretical Literature
Canonical political economy models from Romer, Roberts, and Meltzer and Richard apply the logic of the median voter theorem to the question of redistribution in democracies. 13 The basic model assumes that a proportional income tax is levied on all citizens. The total amount of taxes paid by an individual is given by the tax rate -which is the same for all individuals -multiplied by his/her market income; meaning that those with higher market incomes pay more taxes. The funds emanating from this tax (minus the losses due to the deadweight cost of taxation)
are then redistributed equally to all individuals. The tax rate is selected through majority voting. Notice that, under the assumption that the average income of all voters is fixed, the preferred tax rate of any given voter increases as his/her market income decreases because the amount of taxes that he/she pays diminishes (since the tax rate is proportional to income) while the amount he/she receives from redistribution remains the same (given that the mean income is unchanged).
According to the median voter theorem, the tax rate selected will be that preferred by the voter with the median income. 14 Under the assumption that the distribution of income is right-skewed, the income of the median voter will be lower than the mean income of the country. Therefore, as market inequality increases, the gap between the mean and median incomes should widen, which increases the preferred redistribution level of the median voter. The central theoretical prediction of the RRMR model is thus that democracies that are unequal -or more precisely, democracies that have a high mean-to-median income ratio -should re- 13 Romer 1975; Roberts 1977; Meltzer and Richard 1981. 14 This prediction assumes that voters have single-peaked preferences over redistribution that depend exclusively on their income. distribute more from the rich toward the poor than those that are more equal.
This prediction has played a key role in recent influential theories on democratization and democratic consolidation. 15 According to these arguments, inequality, by increasing redistribution in a democracy, increases both the cost of democracy for the economic elites and the potential gains of democracy for the masses. Building on this insight, Boix, for example, argues that inequality reduces the willingness of the ruling elites to concede democracy to the masses. 16 He thus predicts that inequality should lower the probability of democratization. 34 The empirical analysis below tests the hypotheses that the effect of inequality on redistribu-
Empirical Literature
As pointed out above, the country-level empirical evidence in favor of the prediction that more inequality leads to more redistribution in democracies is discouraging. Tables A11 and A12 of the online appendix respectively). Unfortunately, the lack of data on social mobility and the size of the informal sector for a wide range of countries prevents me from testing the latter arguments. My results, which suggest that inequality is associated with more redistribution, directly contradict the other (nonconditional) alternative explanations. Therefore, I do not test these theories in further detail. 35 Given the large number of studies on the subject, Table 1 
Effect of Inequality on Redistribution
Perotti ( Includes only published studies. The term Social and welfare spending means that the author(s) uses an indicator capturing social and welfare expenditure (e.g., welfare spending or education spending as a proportion of GDP). The exact indicator used may differ across studies. Similarly, the exact measure of inequality used (e.g., Gini indexes or income ratio) may differ across studies. It must be noted that some studies do not use country-year observations. For example, some use five-year averages.
a It must be noted that some studies do not use country-year observations. For example, some use five-year averages. In such instances, the number of observations should be interpreted with caution.
b
The country-level analysis does not include country fixed effects, although the individual-level analysis does.
c
The country-level analysis covers 22 country-year observations, but the individual-level analysis covers more than 11,500 individual-year observations. support for [Meltzer and Richard's] The weakness of the evidence in favor of the RRMR model thus has profound implications for the study of comparative politics.
Most previous empirical tests of the RRMR model, however, share several limitations, which may, at least partially, account for the weakness of the findings.
First, as shown in Table 1 , many studies do not test the effect of inequality on redistribution but rather on social and welfare spending (e.g., welfare transfers, unemployment benefits, or expenditure on education or health care). In fact, the vast majority of the studies that Ansell and Samuels cite to support their claim is really meant to explain redistribution." 42 The problem is that social and welfare spending does not necessarily redistribute from the rich to the poor. This is particularly true in poor countries. In many instances, social transfers, such as expenditure on higher education, actually benefit mostly the middle or even the upper class. 43 Moreover, social and welfare spending may actually be inefficient 39 Ansell and Samuels 2014, p. 5. 40 Ansell and Samuels 2014, p. 6. 41 Ansell and Samuels 2014, p. 5. See footnote 3, p. 5, in particular.
42 Kenworthy and Pontusson 2005, p.456. 43 Le Grand 1982; Milanovic 2000; Ross 2006; Segura-Ubiergo 2007. at reaching its intended recipients. 44 Finally, measures based on spending do not allow for the possibility that, on balance, redistribution is regressive. The dataset used in this paper suggests that in some democracies, inequality is indeed higher after tax and transfers (e.g., see Bulgaria and India in Figure 1 ).
Therefore, in order to test the RRMR model, one has to use measures of redistribution rather than spending. A number of studies, pioneered by Milanovic, have used data on market and net inequality from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) to construct measures of redistribution. 45 Such measures capture the difference between market and net inequality. 46 They thus reveal the extent to which tax and transfers have reduced (or, in some instances, increased) inequality. Notice that this type of indicators allows for the possibility of regressive redistribution. This is the approach that will be followed in the empirical analysis below. However, unlike previous authors, I rely on the data of Solt rather than the LIS, because the latter only covers a small group of mostly advanced industrial democracies (see below).
47
To be clear, the relationship between inequality, on the one hand, and social and welfare spending, on the other hand, is an important field of inquiry. However, it
is not an appropriate test of the RRMR model, since, as suggested by the quote of Kenworthy and Pontusson, this model is primarily about redistribution from the rich to the poor not social and welfare spending. 48 In fact, as shown in Second, several studies use net inequality as their independent variable. 49 The problem is that net inequality measures inequality after redistribution has already taken place, while the RRMR model is about how inequality in market income affects redistribution. Not only is such an indicator of little theoretical relevance, but countries that redistribute heavily will tend to have low net inequality levels, potentially biasing the results against the RRMR model. The relevant indicator is the market inequality: inequality before tax and transfers. As shown in Table   1 , some studies use inequality datasets that blend together observations on net inequality with others on market inequality. In addition to the problem raised above, such studies combine observations that are simply not comparable, further biasing their results.
Seven of the seventeen studies listed in Table 1 it remains substantially larger than that of previous studies. See Section 1 of the online appendix for further detail on the differences between the two samples (and why some observations are coded as more reliable than others).
To identify democracies, I rely on the dataset of Boix et al. 58 The online appendix reproduces the main findings with the measures of democracy of Cheibub et al. (see Table A5 ) and the Polity score (see Table A6 ). 59 Summary statistics for all variables included in the analysis are provided in Table A1 of the online appendix.
The online appendix also lists the data sources for all included variables (see Table   A2 ).
Redistribution: Redistribution, my dependent variable, is measured as the reduction (or increase) in the Gini coefficient due to tax and transfers within a country 56 The restricted sample covers only countries for which Solt has more than three observations on both net and market inequality. In these cases, the measure of redistribution -which captures the difference between market and net inequality -is more reliable. See Section 1 of the online appendix for further detail. 57 Scervini 2012.
58 Boix et al. 2013 .
59 Cheibub et al. 2010. in a given year. Similarly to the scholars discussed above that employ the LIS, Solt uses the indicators of market and net inequality to construct two measures of redistribution.
68
The first is a measure of Absolute Redistribution. It is simply the difference between the market and net Gini indices:
where Gini market i,t is the market Gini coefficient and Gini net i,t the net Gini coefficient of country i in year t. Higher values are associated with higher levels of redistribution because tax and transfers have resulted in a larger reduction in the Gini coefficient.
The second measure of redistribution is termed Relative Redistribution. It is the percentage change between the pre-and post-tax/transfers Gini coefficients of a country during a given year:
where Gini market i,t is the market Gini coefficient and Gini net i,t the net Gini coefficient of country i in year t. Relative Redistribution is thus a percentage, whereas Absolute Redistribution must be interpreted in Gini coefficient units. Notice that these 66 Solt 2009 66 Solt , 2014 67 Solt 2009 Solt , 2014 . I employ the 'mi estimate:' command in Stata.
68 Solt 2009 Solt , 2014 measures may be negative; which would indicate that redistribution is regressive (i.e inequality is larger after than before tax and transfers).
Kenworthy and Pontusson make the argument that Absolute Redistribution is a better indicator of redistribution than Relative Redistribution. 69 This is because the latter is not only affected by redistribution but also by the initial level of inequality (through its denominator). An unequal country will thus have a lower level of
Relative Redistribution than an equal country even if the two countries adopt redistribution policies that result in the same reduction in inequality. Therefore, Relative
Redistribution will tend to give results that are biased against the RRMR model. All regressions presented in the paper and online appendix are performed with both measures of redistribution.
There are two limitations with these measures of redistribution that need to be discussed. First, they do not capture all the policies that governments can use to redistribute. For example, governments can also redistribute through publicly provided goods, such as health care and education, and labor regulations. 70 However, as argued above, it is often difficult in practice to determine whether such policies are unequivocally pro-poor. 71 Therefore, this paper examines only one form of redistribution.
Second, an increase in redistribution, as captured by these measures, does not necessarily mean that redistribution to the median voter has increased. For example, if income is redistributed from the 9th to the 7th income decile, the two mea- does not provide data on both market and net income shares for the same countries during a given year, which would be necessary to calculate how much each income group gains from redistribution.
Market Inequality: My independent variable is the market Gini indices of Solt. 73 Importantly, this provides a measure of inequality before redistribution has taken place. One limitation with using this variable, however, is that it may not directly capture the mean-to-median income ratio. increase with income per capita. The main reason why I start with these simple models is that there are missing values on the other control variables, which reduces the sample size.
The subsequent models include a number of additional control variables. I control for growth rates 76 since one may argue that demand for redistribution increases during economic crises, although the point could also be made that economic downturns diminish the capacity (and willingness) to redistribute. Moreover, I control for the proportion of the GDP emanating from natural resources.
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Governments are less dependent on the population for revenues in countries with significant natural resource wealth. Therefore, I expect them to redistribute less. 88 None of the results included in this study depends on the inclusion of the interaction terms between presidentialism and PR (see Table A10 of the online appendix).
All models include lagged dependent variables. Results are unchanged if the lagged dependent variables are omitted (Table A3 of the online appendix). Finally, all models include year dummy variables. Scheve and Stasavage 2006. capturing the proportion of the population that is Muslim, Roman Catholic and Protestant. 90 Since it may be more difficult to reduce inequality in countries with large populations, I control for the log of the total population. 91 Finally, although in the main analysis I control for trade openness, capital openness may also affect the capacity to tax. In Table A9 , I thus control for capital openness.
Control Variables Used in Robustness Tests:
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Empirical Results However, Figure 1 suggests that, at the very least, there is little evidence of a negative relationship between inequality and redistribution, as reported by many studies listed in Table 1 . Furthermore, Figure 1 illustrates the importance of using measures of market inequality rather than net inequality. Using net inequality, for example, would lead us to overstate the true difference in pre-redistribution 90 Taken from Przeworski et al. 2000. 91 Taken from the World Bank. inequality between countries such as Sweden and the United States. As shown in Figure 1 , a large portion of the gap in net inequality between these two countries is actually due to differences in redistribution levels rather than in market inequality.
As discussed above, country-specific factors are likely to influence both market inequality and redistribution, potentially creating omitted variable bias. Therefore, Figure 2 looks at the relationship between market inequality and absolute redistribution over time among a selected number of democracies. I chose democracies for which a significant number of observations are available and covered all major geographic regions. In most instances, pre-tax/transfers inequality is associated with higher levels of redistribution, even though in some cases the relationship is weak (e.g., India) or negative (e.g., Mexico). This preliminary analysis thus provides some support for the RRMR model. Table 2 gives the estimates of the effect of market inequality on redistribution among democracies using ordinary least squares estimations with robust standard errors clustered by country. Table 2 uses the extended sample. As explained above, In column 4, increasing the market Gini index by one unit now increases redistribution by 0.389 units as compared to 0.096 units when country fixed effects are omitted. These findings suggest that the previous studies that have not accounted for country-specific unobserved factors substantially underestimate the effect of inequality on redistribution.
Main Analysis
As shown in Figure 1 , Western countries redistribute much more than other democracies. Models 1-4 already control for income per capita, but that may be insufficient. Therefore, columns 5-8 reproduce columns 1-4 with only non-Western 93 Solt 2009 Solt , 2014 Presidential and PR dummy variables along with ethnic diversity are omitted from these regressions because of limited variation within countries over time. 
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Note: The extended sample includes all observations for which Solt (2009 Solt ( , 2014 provides net and market Gini indices. Each estimation uses one hundred imputed values on market inequality and redistribution. Models are estimated using 'mi estimate:' in Stata. Absolute redistribution is measured as the difference between market and net inequality (see equation 1). Relative redistribution is measured as the difference between market and net inequality relative to market inequality (see equation 2). Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. ***p < .01, **p < .05 and *p < .1. 
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Note: The restricted sample includes only the observations that are coded as the most reliable. These are countries for which Solt has more than three observations on both net and market inequality (see Section 1 of the online appendix for more detail). Each estimation uses one hundred imputed values on market inequality and redistribution. Models are estimated using 'mi estimate:' in Stata. Absolute redistribution is measured as the difference between market and net inequality (see equation 1). Relative redistribution is measured as the difference between market and net inequality relative to market inequality (see equation 2). Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. ***p < .01, **p < .05 and *p < .1.
countries. 95 Again, market inequality is found to increase redistribution. Results are also unchanged if I exclude OECD countries rather than Western countries (available upon request).
Models 1-8 of Table 2 use the measure of absolute redistribution (equation 1).
Columns 9-12 redo models 2, 3, 5 and 6 using the relative redistribution measure (equation 2). As discussed above, the latter indicator makes it more difficult to find support for a positive relationship between market inequality and redistribution.
However, results are unchanged. In model 9, an increase in the market Gini coefficient by one unit increases redistribution by 0.136 percent. Again, the magnitude of the effect increases substantially once country fixed effects are added. Table 3 retests the relationship using the restricted sample, which contains only the most reliable observations. Although the size of the sample decreases substantially, the findings are unchanged and the substantive effect of market inequality on redistribution often increases. Again, even though the restricted sample is smaller than the extended sample, it is still much larger than the most comprehensive previous studies. I also reproduce Tables A3-A13 of the online appendix with only this subset of observations. Again, the effect of market inequality remains positive and statistically significant at least at the five percent level in all specifications (available upon request).
Robustness Tests
Additional robustness tests are presented in the online appendix. A number of authors have raised concerns regarding the inclusion of lagged dependent variables. 96 Therefore, Tables 2 and 3 , I use the measure of democracy of Boix et al. 98 In the online appendix, I redo the main models of Table 2 with the measures of Cheibub et al. (Table A5 ) and the Polity score (Table A6) . 99 As suggested by the Polity IV Project, countries with Polity scores of at least six are classified as democracies. In Table A7 of the online appendix, I further show that the results are not driven by outliers on redistribution or market inequality. Table A8 of the online appendix demonstrates that the results are robust to the inclusion of additional controls: total population logged, the age of the democracy, and the proportion of the population that is Muslim, Roman Catholic, and Protestant. Table A9 shows that the results are also robust to the inclusion of a measure of capital openness. 100 Table A10 shows that the results are unchanged when the interaction term between PR and presidentialism is omitted.
Finally, to make sure that my results are not affected by multicollinearity, I com-97 I have also redone all the other robustness tests reported in the online appendix (Tables A4-A12 ) without lagged dependent variables and the effect of market inequality is positive and statistically significant at the one percent level in all specifications (available upon request).
98 Boix et al. 2013. 99 Cheibub et al. 2010 .
100 I do not include capital openness in Table A8 because of the large number of missing values on that variable. Nonetheless, the results are unchanged when capital openness is included along with all variables included in Table A8 (available upon request).
puted the variance inflation factor (VIF) for all variables included in model 2 of 
Discussion of the Control Variables
Most control variables are found to have little effect on redistribution. However, once we omit the lagged dependent variables and the year dummy variables (see Table A13 of the online appendix), we find that the effect of the control variables is usually consistent with the findings of previous authors, most of which do not use lagged dependent variables and year dummy variables. As expected, rich democracies redistribute more. However, once country fixed effects are included, the relationship vanishes. Moreover, consistent with the previous literature, countries in with large elderly populations redistribute more.
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As shown in Table A13 , ethnically divided democracies redistribute less than those that are more homogeneous, although the effect is only significant when the sample is restricted to non-Western countries. This is consistent with the expectations of scholars such as Alesina and Glaeser. 102 However, as discussed above, many authors have argued that the effect of inequality on redistribution weakens as ethnic diversity increases (i.e. that the relationship is conditional). Therefore, in Table A11 of the online appendix, I redo the main models of Table 2 with an interaction term between market inequality and ethnic diversity. 103 Results show 101 For example, Bassett et al. 1999 .
102 Alesina and Glaeser 2005. 103 This test is admittedly imperfect. The arguments of previous authors suggest that ethnic diversity within the lower class, not ethnic diversity within the whole population, should be associated with less redistribution. Ethnic diversity may reduce the effect of inequality on redistribution if little evidence that the effect of inequality on redistribution diminishes as ethnic diversity increases.
Electoral turnout is usually associated with more redistribution. This is consistent with the findings of previous authors. 104 However, the effect of turnout is usually weak. It must be noted, though, that the relationship strengthens substantially and becomes statistically significant once the dummy variable for PR -which itself affects turnout -is dropped and country fixed effects are omitted (available upon request). Moreover, as for ethnic diversity, many authors actually argue that the effect of market inequality on redistribution is conditional on electoral turnout.
Again, I test this hypothesis by adding an interaction term between inequality and turnout (see Table A12 of the online appendix). I find little evidence that the (positive) effect of inequality on redistribution increases as turnout increases.
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Finally, as shown in Table A13 , executive-legislative institutions, captured by the dummy variable for presidential regimes, and electoral institutions matter for redistribution. As shown by Feld and Schnellenbach, presidential democracies redistribute less, on average, than parliamentary democracies. 106 Moreover, the effect of the electoral system is conditional on the executive-legislative institutions.
Parliamentary democracies that have proportional representation (PR) redistribute the most, while presidential systems with PR usually have the lowest level of redistribution. Presumably, this is because the latter combination is particularly prone to deadlocks, which prevents the adoption of potentially controversial policies.
members of the ethnic minorities are poor relative to the rest of the population. 104 For example, Larcinese 2007; Mahler 2008; Mahler et al. 2014. 105 Notice that my results are not consistent with the expectations of the other (non-conditional) alternative approaches discussed above (e.g., power resource and insurance approaches) since I find that more inequality is associated with more redistribution. Therefore, I do not test these alternative approaches more specifically. 106 Feld and Schnellenbach 2014.
Conclusion
Important political science research builds on the prediction of the Romer-RobertsMeltzer-Richard (RRMR) model that more inequality leads to more redistribution in democracies. Unfortunately, cross-national empirical studies using countrylevel data have typically failed to find support for this prediction. In this paper, I retest this relationship using a sample of 91 developed and developing democracies between 1960 and 2007. I show that, consistent with the RRMR model and in spite of the consensus that prevails among most scholars, more inequality is associated with more redistribution.
In addition to the limitations on the dependent and independent variables discussed above, a few caveats are in order before concluding. Although my results are consistent with the expectations of the RRMR model, additional analyses will need to be conducted before we can definitively conclude that this model is valid.
First, causal mechanisms other than those proposed by the RRMR model could explain why inequality is correlated with higher redistribution levels at the countrylevel. Further investigation on the mechanisms driving the relationship ought to be conducted. Second, this paper has tested the RRMR model using country-level data. This is only one of multiple possible angles that can be used to assess its validity (albeit a crucial one). Country-level tests need to be combined with those of authors using individual-level data, for instance. As discussed above, while some individual-level studies obtain results that are consistent with the RRMR model 107 , others do not. 108 Third, analyses of the effect of inequality on redistribution through tax and transfers, such as the one presented in this paper, ought to be complemented by other analyses that look at the effect of inequality on other
